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AwarenessHumans have a capacity to become aware of thoughts and behaviours known as metacog-
nition. Metacognitive efﬁciency refers to the relationship between subjective reports and
objective behaviour. Understanding how this efﬁciency changes as we age is important
because poor metacognition can lead to negative consequences, such as believing one is
a good driver despite a recent spate of accidents. We quantiﬁed metacognition in two
cognitive domains, perception and memory, in healthy adults between 18 and 84 years
old, employing measures that dissociate objective task performance from metacognitive
efﬁciency. We identiﬁed a marked decrease in perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency with
age and a non-signiﬁcant decrease in memory metacognitive efﬁciency. No signiﬁcant rela-
tionship was identiﬁed between executive function and metacognition in either domain.
Annual decline in metacognitive efﬁciency after controlling for executive function was
0.6%. Decreases in metacognitive efﬁciency may explain why dissociations between
behaviour and beliefs become more marked as we age.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Metacognition refers to ‘thinking about thinking’ (Flavell, 1979), or the ability to become aware of thoughts and behav-
iours. Metacognition is a fundamental aspect of higher cognition in humans (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009) and may support
conscious awareness (Koriat, 2007), social interaction (Frith, 2012), and be impaired in neuropsychiatric disorders (David,
Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012). Metacognition comprises both monitoring and control (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996;
Nelson, 1996). Intuitively, a person has good metacognitive monitoring if their subjective appraisals track their objective
behaviour on a trial-by-trial basis. For example, an individual who is metacognitively efﬁcient will report high conﬁdence
when they are objectively correct, and low conﬁdence when they are objectively incorrect; conversely an individual with
poor metacognitive efﬁciency has poor awareness, manifested by subjective reports that are unrelated to task performance.
Different cognitive domains give rise to different types of metacognitive judgment. For example, in the perceptual domain
one might have variable conﬁdence about seeing or hearing a particular stimulus. Metacognitive judgments about memory
may refer to whether one’s recall or recognition is likely to have been correct (a retrospective conﬁdence rating) or whether a
stimulus is likely to be remembered or recognised in the future (‘‘judgments of learning’’, JOLs; and ‘‘feelings of knowing’’,
FOK). Overall, metacognitive judgments are thought to be based on a combination of perceptual or mnemonic strength and
additional analytic factors (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Vickers, 1979). Previous
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mary cognitive capacity (see Fleming & Dolan, 2012, for a review).
However, there is some debate as to whether metacognition changes as we age. On the one hand, we might expect greater
life experience leads to more accurate self-knowledge and greater metacognitive efﬁciency. On the other hand, convergent
evidence has revealed a speciﬁc neural basis for metacognitive efﬁciency in human prefrontal and parietal cortex (Fleming,
Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell,
Passingham, & Lau, 2010; Yokoyama et al., 2010) regions which are also highly susceptible to aging-related atrophy (Raz
et al., 2005; Resnick, Pham, Kraut, Zonderman, & Davatzikos, 2003) and therefore metacognitive efﬁciency may be expected
to decrease as we age. Such a hypothesis is consistent with reports that lack of awareness of cognitive, physical and percep-
tual abilities in healthy older adults can be problematic in everyday life. (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000) demonstrated that there
are notable changes in self-appraisal as we age, and these tend to centre on inaccuracies regarding beliefs about cognitive
ability and control over cognition. Older adults tend to demonstrate increased over-conﬁdence compared to actual perfor-
mance when compared to younger adults (Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007; Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008). For
example when older adults between the ages of 65–91 years old were asked about their driving abilities, 85% of the drivers in
this age range rated themselves as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ drivers despite an increased frequency of accidents (Ross, Dodson,
Edwards, Ackerman, & Ball, 2012).
However, the literature on laboratory measures of metacognition such as conﬁdence judgments and JOLs has shown
mixed results. Some studies reveal stable or even improved accuracy of conﬁdence ratings with age for general knowledge
(Dodson et al., 2007; Pliske & Mutter, 1996), problem solving (Vukman, 2005), or memory recall tasks (Lachman, Lachman, &
Thronesbery, 1979). Similarly, studies investigating JOLs, FOKs and ‘‘judgments of forgetting’’ have found that older adults’
predictions of recall or recognition were as good as those of younger adults (Eakin, Hertzog, & Harris, 2014; Haber, 2012;
Halamish, McGillivray, & Castel, 2011). In contrast, other studies report signiﬁcant age differences in the accuracy of conﬁ-
dence judgments about recall and recognition (Bender & Raz, 2012; Dodson et al., 2007; Huff, Meade, & Hutchison, 2011;
Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; Pansky, Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pearlman-Avnion, 2009; Perrotin, Isingrini, Souchay, Clarys, &
Taconnat, 2006; Soderstrom, McCabe, & Rhodes, 2012; Souchay, Isingrini, & Espagnet, 2000; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys,
Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2007; Toth, Daniels, & Solinger, 2011; Wong, Cramer, & Gallo, 2012) learning of emotional information
(Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012), and study-time allocation (Froger, Sacher, Gaudouen, Isingrini, & Taconnat, 2011). In addition,
the neural correlates of metacognitive judgments have been found to differ between younger and older adults (Chua,
Schacter, & Sperling, 2009).
In many of these studies it has proven difﬁcult to decouple metacognitive accuracy from age-related changes in perfor-
mance. Common measures of metacognitive accuracy such as the gamma correlation are affected by task performance
(Masson & Rotello, 2009), potentially confounding changes in metacognition with age with changes in performance. For
example, if two individuals A and B have identical metacognitive ability, but A performs better than B on the primary task,
A’s metacognition score will appear higher than B’s due to this performance confound. Accordingly, Daniels, Toth, and
Hertzog (2009) found that older adults had lower accuracy of immediate JOLs for predicting old/new item recognition,
but reasoned that this may reﬂect age-related memory deﬁcits as opposed to deﬁcits in metacognition. In the present study
we employ a recently developed signal detection theoretic measure, meta-d0/d0 (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), to circumvent this
problem. Meta-d0/d0 quantiﬁes the efﬁciency with which conﬁdence ratings discriminate between correct and incorrect trials
in each task domain (perception and memory). Importantly, meta-d0/d0 is a relative measure: given a certain level of process-
ing capacity (d0), meta-d0/d0 quantiﬁes the extent to which a metacognitively optimal observer is aware of their performance.
Previous literature has also drawn conceptual similarities between characteristics of memory metacognition and execu-
tive functions (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Shimamura, 1995; Souchay et al., 2000). In
particular it has been suggested that any age-related decline in metacognition may be due to executive limitations associ-
ated with aging (Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). Again, however, results from initial studies examining this issue are mixed. FOK
but not JOL accuracy has been shown to signiﬁcantly correlate with executive function (Souchay, Isingrini, Clarys, Taconnat,
& Eustache, 2004), indicating that perhaps only some forms of metacognitive judgement require intact executive function to
be completed accurately. Perrotin, Belleville, and Isingrini (2007) compared patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI)
to healthy age-matched controls in their FOK abilities. FOK accuracy was primarily related to primary memory performance
in MCI patients, whereas in control participants it was linked to executive function.
In the present study we therefore examined the effects of both age and executive function on a performance-controlled
measure of metacognitive efﬁciency (meta-d0/d0). We studied retrospective conﬁdence judgments in two domains, percep-
tion and memory, following recent evidence that metacognition across different domains may draw upon dissociable neural
and cognitive processes (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Recruitment
Participants were recruited via two distinct sampling methods as part of a larger clinical research study. A copy of the
Royal Mail Postal Address File (PAF), containing all residential addresses in the boroughs of Lambeth and Southwark (London,
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total of 28 participants were recruited using this method. Participants verbally conﬁrmed an absence of mild cognitive
impairment (MCI) or memory disorder.
Participants were also recruited using the MindSearch database, available to researchers based at King’s College, London.
Participants who had registered their details with the database and met the inclusion criteria (n = 585) for this study were
selected. All potential participants were contacted via email twice in a 6 month period, with a total of 32 participants
responding positively and being included in the study. Our inclusion criteria required participants to be over the age of
18 and have no previous or current presentation of a psychosis related disorder, MCI, memory disorders or Alzheimer’s
dementia.
We compared our healthy older adult sample to a sample of conﬁrmedMCI patients who were screened as part of a larger
clinical study (criteria = scoring > 20 on the MMSE and failing at least one section of the Consortium to Establish a Registry
for Alzheimer’s Disease (CERAD) neuropsychological battery). The PAF and MindSearch participants performed signiﬁcantly
better on the Wechsler Memory Scale (immediate and long term recall, long term recognition) and Trails B-A executive
function test than the clinical sample. Therefore we can be conﬁdent that the majority of the participants included were
not suffering from undiagnosed MCI.
There was no signiﬁcant difference between the two recruitment methods regarding mean group age (t = .27, p = .79),
years in education (t = .49, p = .63) or BDI score (t = .52, p = .61). The sample was recruited using opportunity sampling
within the two methods with no set age/gender cells ﬁlled. Two subjects with Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; (Beck &
Steer, 1984) scores greater than 20 were excluded from further analysis. All participants had normal or corrected to normal
vision.
2.2. Participants
Our sample consisted of 60 participants, 33 of whom were female. The mean age was 40.28 years old, with a minimum of
18 and maximum of 84 years old, with no difference in age between males and females (t(58) = 0.76, p = 0.45). The mean
depression score was 6.03 (SD = 4.32) out of a possible 64 indicating that the sample was not depressed. A subset of partic-
ipants completed the memory metacognition and neuropsychological tests; therefore for each test the relevant N is stated
(Table 1).
2.3. Metacognition measures
Perceptual metacognitive ability was investigated using a computerised visual perceptual task similar to that used previ-
ously (Fleming et al., 2010). Each trial required participants to perform a perceptual task. The stimuli used were Gabor
patches: circular patches of alternating light and dark vertical bars (2.8 visual degrees in diameter, spatial frequency of
2.2 cycles per visual degree). The contrast between the vertical lines in each standard Gabor patch was 20%, where 0% indi-
cates no difference between the light and dark bars and 100%, the maximum difference (black to white). Six such Gabor
patches were arranged in a circle (eccentricity of 6.9 visual degrees) around a central ﬁxation point set on a uniform grey
background (see Fig. 1a). One of the six Gabor patches was made to pop-out from the others by increasing the contrast in
that patch. The contrast of the pop-out Gabor patches varied from 23% (little effect of pop-out) to 80% (pop-out very clear).
The task required participants to view two stimulus arrays, each presented for 200 ms, separated by an interval of 300 ms.
The interval between stimuli was ﬁlled by a uniform grey screen without the Gabor patches. A single Gabor patch in one of
the two intervals was designated as a pop-out. Which of the six Gabor patches popped-out varied randomly between trials.
Participants were prompted by a computer display to respond ‘1’ or ‘2’ as to whether they thought the pop-out Gabor
patch appeared during the ﬁrst or second presentation. Participants responded by pressing the numerical keys on the topTable 1
Characteristics of participants and experimental measures together with their relationship with age. (⁄ P < 0.05; ⁄⁄P < 0.01.)
Measure N Mean (SD) Range Corr. with age (Pearson’s r) P-value
Participant characteristics BDI 60 6.03 (4.32) 0–20 0.08 0.54
Years of education 60 14.6 (2.5) 7–17 0.37 0.003**
Neuropsychological tests WAIS-III IQ 39 115.1 (15.9) 76–146 0.28 0.08
Trails B-A 44 30.5 (20.4) 11.3–99.1 0.20 0.18
Wechsler Memory Scale
(age-adjusted)
Immediate 34 11.2 (3.67) 14 .036 .839
Delayed 34 12.1 (3.69) 13 .025 .892
Recognition 33 26.6 (3.68) 19 .302 .088
Metacognitive accuracy Perceptual meta-d0/d0 53 1.08 (0.34) 0.40–1.96 0.38 0.0051**
Memory meta-d0/d0 38 0.73 (0.81) 2.25–1.85 0.064 0.70
⁄P < 0.05.
** P < 0.01.
Fig. 1. (a) Both the perceptual and memory tasks required two judgments per trial: a two-alternative forced-choice perceptual/mnemonic decision
followed by an estimate of relative conﬁdence in each decision. (a) Perception task. Participants responded as to which interval (ﬁrst, second) contained the
‘‘pop out’’ grating stimulus and then rated conﬁdence in their decision. (b) Memory task. At the beginning of each block, participants studied a list of 50
words arranged in 10 rows and 5 columns (a 8 row  3 column example is shown here for display purposes). On each trial participants were asked to
indicate which word (left or right) was on the previously studied list and to subsequently rate their conﬁdence in their decision.
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red box surrounded their selection. No feedback was given as to whether they were right or wrong.
Participants then indicated conﬁdence in their decision on a scale of 1–6 (1: relatively low conﬁdence; 6: relatively high
conﬁdence; see Fig. 1a.). Participants were encouraged to use the full range of the scale, thinking carefully about how con-
ﬁdent they were after each decision. Participants responded by pressing numerically marked keys on the top left-hand side
of the laptop keyboard with their left hand, with a red box again surrounding this selection. Participants had 3.5 s to com-
plete this metacognitive judgement. Performance on the task was maintained at around 70% using a 2-down, 1-up staircase
procedure (Levitt, 1971). Two consecutive correct visual judgments led to a one step (3%) decrease in contrast of the pop-out
Gabor patch in the next trial, whereas one incorrect visual judgment led to a one step increase in contrast of the pop-out
patch. This procedure ensures all participants perform with approximately the same accuracy on the primary perceptual
task, allowing us to measure metacognitive ability independent of task performance. This was especially useful in the pres-
ent study as the range of participant ages may otherwise have led to performance bias. Older participants who struggled to
make manual responses gave verbal answers to a researcher who made manual responses. The task comprised 5 blocks of
8 min with short breaks between each block, taking approximately 50 min to complete.
A standard task instruction sheet was read through by participants on their own, followed by the opportunity to ask the
task administrator questions. Participants were seated in a darkened room approximately 60 cm from a laptop computer
screen (Sony Vaio, PCG-71614 M laptop; 17 in display; 1280  800 pixels). Stimulus display and responses for the tasks were
programmed in MATLAB 7.8 (Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA) using the COGENT 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.
uk/cogent.php). A practice session of two blocks of eight trials was given at the start to familiarise participants with the task.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.
Memory metacognitive ability was investigated using the 2-alternative forced choice (AFC) memory conﬁdence task
devised by McCurdy et al. (2013) (see Fig. 1b). There were three learning and testing blocks, with a different learning time
assigned to each block. At the beginning of each block, 50 English words (Calibri font, size 24) were presented simulta-
neously on the screen for either 0.5, 1, or 1.5 min to create three levels of difﬁculty in which participants performed at nei-
ther chance nor ceiling. English words were generated using the Medical Research Council Psycholinguistic Database
(Wilson, 1988). These standard nouns were four to eight letters long, had one to three syllables, and had a familiarity,
concreteness, and imagability rating of 400–700 each. Participants were instructed to memorize as many words on the list
as possible during the study period. A small notice appeared at the bottom of the screen to inform them when there was 10 s
left to study the list. After the study period, a series of trials probing memory for the word list was presented. In each trial,
two words were presented to the left and right of ﬁxation. One of these words had been presented on the study list (‘‘old’’),
and the other word had not been presented previously (‘‘new’’). First, participants had 3s to provide a 2-AFC judgment with
regard to which word was ‘old’, where pressing ‘1’ referred to the left hand word and ‘2’ referred to the right hand word.
Participants then had 3 s to press one of four keys (‘‘7,’’ ‘‘8,’’ ‘‘9,’’ or ‘‘0’’) using their right hand to indicate their
conﬁdence in being correct on the 2-AFC judgment (signifying ‘‘not at all conﬁdent’’ to ‘‘very conﬁdent’’ respectively). Older
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task comprised 3 blocks of approximately 5 min each with short breaks in between each block.
2.3.1. Calculating metacognitive efﬁciency
Metacognitive efﬁciency was quantiﬁed using the meta-d0 measure developed by Maniscalco and Lau (2012). Meta-d0/d0
is a relative measure: given a certain level of processing capacity (d0), meta-d0/d0 quantiﬁes the extent to which a metacog-
nitively optimal observer is aware of their performance. A meta-d0/d0 value of 1 is equivalent to metacognitively ‘‘ideal’’,
whereas meta-d0/d0 < 1 indicates a failure of metacognitive awareness. Values of meta-d0/d0 greater than 1 indicate that
awareness is more accurate than task performance, which may occur for instance if the initial judgment is made under time
pressure (Charles, Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013). Meta-d0 was calculated using MATLAB code available at http://
www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) for both perceptual and memory metacognition.
2.4. Neuropsychological measures
IQ was measured using the shortened Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b) which
comprises the Digit Symbol Coding, Arithmetic, Information and Block Design sub-components of the full WAIS assessment;
39 participants completed this assessment.
Executive function (EF) was measured using the ‘‘Trail Making’’ test (Reitan, 1986), which measures ‘set-shifting’, or the
ability to shift attention between one task to another. This test consists of two parts in which the subject is instructed to
connect a set of 25 dots as fast as possible while still maintaining accuracy. The ﬁrst task (A) requires participants to connect
numbers in ascending order and the second task (B) requires participants to connect the dots, alternating between numbers
and letters (in alphabetical order). Time taken to complete both tasks is recorded and a ‘B-A’ score is calculated by subtract-
ing the time taken in task A from time taken in task B. The longer the composite time (B-A) the worse the set-shifting ability.
44 participants completed this assessment.
The Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) ‘logical memory’ sub-task (Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b) was used to gauge short-term,
long-term and recognition memory. The logical memory task is a sub-test within the whole WMS battery, designed to detect
attention and memory deﬁcits, and asks participants to listen to and remember two spoken stories. After hearing each story
participants are asked to immediately recount the story to the researcher (Immediate test), where a higher score is obtained
by recalling more key facts. 30 min after the stories are initially heard participants are asked again to recount the stories to
the researcher (Delayed test). Finally, a recognition task is then carried out, where participants are asked 15 questions about
each story and required to give ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers (Recognition test). 34 participants completed the short-term recall
(Immediate) test, and 33 participants completed the long-term recall (Delayed) and recognition (Recognition) tests.
2.5. Data analysis
Correlations between metacognitive efﬁciency (meta-d0/d0), age and neuropsychological measures were computed using
Pearson’s product-moment correlations implemented in R 3.0.1. 5 subjects who performed lower than 65% in the perceptual
task (indicating a failure of the staircase procedure to appropriately control performance) were excluded from analyses of
perceptual task data. Regression analyses were carried out using the lm function in R and un-standardised regression
coefﬁcients are reported.
3. Results
The mean percentage of trials answered correctly on the perceptual task was 70.8% (range 65.7–73.6%), with no signiﬁ-
cant relationship between age and percentage of trials answered correctly (r = 0.16, p = 0.25; n = 53). The mean percentage
of trials answered correctly on the memory task was 67.8% (range 49–87%). Performance on the memory task was lower in
older adults leading to a negative correlation between age and performance (r = 0.36, p = 0.03; n = 38).
We calculated a metacognitive efﬁciency score (meta-d0/d0) for each participant on both perceptual and memory tasks.
The average efﬁciency score was 1.08 (SD = 0.34) for the perceptual task and 0.73 (SD = 0.81) for the memory task. In the
subset of subjects who completed both tasks (N = 32), metacognitive efﬁciency tended to be greater for perception than
for memory (t(31) = 2.19, p = 0.04). Consistent with previous ﬁndings (McCurdy et al., 2013) we found a positive association
between metacognitive efﬁciencies across domains (r = 0.40, p = 0.02; n = 32; see Fig. 2a.) However, when two memory
metacognition outliers were removed (greater than 2 standard deviations beyond the group mean; see Fig. 2a) this relation-
ship failed to reach signiﬁcance (r = 0.25, p = 0.19; n = 30).
No signiﬁcant relationships were identiﬁed between IQ and metacognitive efﬁciency (perceptual: r = 0.12, p = 0.51,
n = 33; memory: r = 0.11, p = 0.60, n = 27) or years of education and metacognitive efﬁciency (perceptual: r = 0.016,
p = 0.25, n = 53; memory: r = 0.003, p = 0.98, n = 38), consistent with previous reports of a lack of correlation between IQ
and metacognition in younger adults (Fleming et al., 2012; Weil et al., 2013). Signiﬁcant relationships were identiﬁed
between WMS scores and memory metacognitive efﬁciency (immediate, r = .37, p = .05, n = 28; delayed, r = .59, p = .01,
Fig. 2. (a) Scatter plot demonstrating the positive relationship between perceptual and memory metacognitive efﬁciency in the subset of subjects who
completed both tasks (r = 0.40, p = 0.02; N = 32). Two outliers are highlighted in grey . The dotted trend line indicates the relationship when outliers are
removed (r = 0.25, p = 0.19; n = 30). (b) Scatter plot demonstrating the negative relationship between perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency and age
(r = 0.38, p = 0.005). (c) Individual components of metacognitive efﬁciency (d0 ,meta-d0) plotted as a function of age. A combined increase in d0 and decrease
in meta-d0 led to the overall decrease in efﬁciency shown in panel (b).
156 E.C. Palmer et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 28 (2014) 151–160n = 27; recognition, r = .37, p = .05, n = 27), but not perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency (immediate, r = .12, p = .54, n = 29;
delayed, r = .05, p = .79, n = 28; recognition, r = .07, p = .73, n = 28).
We next turned to the relationship between metacognition and age. We found a signiﬁcant negative relationship between
perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency (meta-d0/d0) and age (r = 0.38, p = 0.005; n = 53; see Fig. 2b). Thus, despite our measure
of metacognition controlling for differences in task performance, older adults showed lower awareness of their perceptual
task performance than younger adults. The relationship between age and memory metacognitive efﬁciency (meta-d0/d0)
was negative but was non-signiﬁcant (r = 0.064, p = 0.70; n = 38). We cannot however draw conclusions regarding a differ-
ential effect of age on perceptual compared to memory metacognition as the difference between the domain-speciﬁc meta-
cognitive efﬁciency-age correlations in the subset of subjects who completed both perceptual and memory tasks was itself
not signiﬁcant (Hotelling’s t = 0.66, p = 0.51).
As meta-d0/d0 is a ratio between two quantities, changes in either or both of its components may contribute to an overall
decrease in metacognitive efﬁciency in the perceptual task. Examining each component separately, in the perceptual task we
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p = 0.22; n = 53). Under the ideal observer model, d0 should be equal to meta-d0. Thus both an increase in performance
and a decrease in the ability to appraise this performance (given a particular level of d0) contributed to the observed decrease
in overall efﬁciency (Fig. 2c). For the memory task, there were no signiﬁcant changes in either d0 (r = 0.016, p = 0.92; n = 38)
or meta-d0 (r = 0.15, p = 0.36) with age.
Finally, we considered that the relationship between metacognitive efﬁciency and age may be mediated by changes in
executive function. In order to assess this hypothesis we constructed a general linear model (GLM) that predicted metacog-
nitive efﬁciency from age and executive function as measured by the Trail Making Test. This analysis was restricted to a sub-
set of participants who conducted the Trail Making Test (N = 44). We found that the relationship between age and perceptual
metacognitive efﬁciency remained signiﬁcant after controlling for changes in executive function (b = 0.0058, p = 0.02), and
increased executive function was not associated with better metacognitive efﬁciency (b = 0.0042, p = 0.26).
4. Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the effects of age on metacognitive efﬁciency in healthy adults between
the ages of 18 and 84. We found that perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency declined with age, despite task performance being
controlled to ensure all participants performed with the same accuracy. In other words, older adults were less efﬁcient at
introspecting about whether they are performing well or badly on a perceptual task than younger adults. This result is con-
sistent with previous observations of a weaker match between beliefs and abilities in older adults (Hultsch, MacDonald,
Hunter, Levy-Bencheton, & Strauss, 2000; Ross et al., 2012) and age-related differences in the accuracy of conﬁdence judg-
ments (Bender & Raz, 2012; Dodson et al., 2007; Huff et al., 2011; Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; Pansky et al., 2009; Audrey
Perrotin et al., 2006; Soderstrom et al., 2012; Souchay et al., 2000, 2007; Toth et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2012). However, many
previous studies did not control for the inﬂuence of task performance on measures of metacognition. This is particularly
critical when studying aging as metacognitive ability may be difﬁcult to distil from other age-related changes in cognitive
abilities. In the current study we employ a measure of metacognition, meta-d0/d0, that controls for the inﬂuence of task
performance and response bias (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).
Our results extend those of Weil et al. (2013) who took a similar approach to study the development of metacognitive
efﬁciency during adolescence. In a sample of 28 adolescents and 28 adults it was found that perceptual metacognitive efﬁ-
ciency increased with age during adolescence (11–18 years old), with a non-signiﬁcant decrease with age in adulthood.
However the maximum age in Weil et al’s sample of older adults was 41, precluding the study of metacognitive efﬁciency
in older age. Here we extend this age range to 84, ﬁnding that efﬁciency continues to decline despite task performance
remaining stable.
A subset of subjects additionally completed a recognition memory task that allowed us to calculate a metacognitive efﬁ-
ciency score in the memory domain. We found a positive correlation in efﬁciency scores across domains that was weakened
after removal of two outliers. Our result provides some support for the notion that there is a global correlation in metacog-
nitive ability across domains (McCurdy et al., 2013), but also is consistent with a large proportion of domain-speciﬁc vari-
ance that may be linked to separate brain systems underpinning perceptual and memory metacognition (Baird et al., 2013;
McCurdy et al., 2013). There was no effect of age on memory metacognition, but we are cautious about over-interpreting this
null result for two reasons: ﬁrst, fewer subjects completed the memory task, reducing our power to detect an effect of age;
and second, there was no statistical support for a differential effect of age on perceptual vs. memory metacognition. Further
work is required to ascertain whether may be different trajectories for age-related changes in domain-speciﬁc metacognitive
functions.
Mixed results were obtained for the effect of age on measures of basic task performance (% correct and d0). In the percep-
tual task, effects of age on these two measures had opposite sign (negative for% correct and positive for d0). Dissociations
between% correct and d0 are possible if the decision criterion is also changing (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). However such
differences in the current study are difﬁcult to interpret, because performance was controlled in the perceptual task such
that% correct varied over a narrow range, and poorly performing subjects were excluded prior to analysis. It is possible that
increases in d0 with age reﬂect an overcompensation in difﬁculty adjustment that made the task slightly easier for older
adults. In the memory task, % correct declined with age, whereas this effect was not seen in an analysis of d0.
The meta-d0 approach estimates the subject’s metacognitive accuracy in units directly comparable to d0, a measure of
primary task performance (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). For a metacognitively ideal observer, meta-d0 = d0, and meta-d0/d0 = 1.
Closer examination of the relationship between these quantities and age revealed an increase in perceptual d0 and a decrease
in perceptual meta-d0, leading to an overall decrease in metacognitive efﬁciency (Fig. 2c). As noted above, the narrow range
of performance levels in the perceptual task precludes strong interpretation of changes in d0. However, the relative values of
d0 and meta-d0 are informative. In younger adults, meta-d0 is similar to or slightly above d0 (meta-d0/d0  1), whereas in older
adults, meta-d0 drops below d0, leading to metacognitive efﬁciency scores less than expected on an ideal observer model.
One might expect that age-related changes in metacognitive processes would be related to neuropsychological measures
of executive function (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000), following evidence that perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency is linked to
frontal lobe function (Fleming et al., 2010; Hoerold, Pender, & Robertson, 2013; Persaud et al., 2011; Rounis et al., 2010).
Previous studies have found evidence for a link between the use of metacognitive information in the control of behaviour
158 E.C. Palmer et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 28 (2014) 151–160and executive function as measured by Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance (Pansky et al., 2009; Souchay & Isingrini,
2004), but the relationship between executive function and metacognitive monitoring is less well understood. In particular,
it is difﬁcult to rule out an indirect effect of executive function on measures of metacognition via effects on primary task
performance, highlighting the need to distil a measure of metacognitive efﬁciency that controls for differences in perfor-
mance. In the current study, we did not ﬁnd evidence for a relationship between perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency and
performance on the Trail Making Test, a measure of set-shifting. Indeed, in a regression analysis explicitly controlling for
changes in set-shifting performance, we observed an annual decline of 0.6% in metacognitive efﬁciency. Of course, executive
function is a very broad construct, and the relationship between metacognitive efﬁciency and other components such as
inhibition and updating (Miyake et al., 2000) remain to be determined.
The perceptual and memory metacognition tasks were adapted from those used in recent structural and functional imag-
ing studies of healthy participants (Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013). However a limitation of this
design is that there are differences between tasks that are potentially orthogonal to the domain in question. For example, our
recognition memory task involved verbal stimuli; we cannot rule out the possibility that a different pattern of results would
be obtained with memory tasks using nonverbal stimuli such as faces. Indeed, an important goal for future work is the devel-
opment of perceptual and memory metacognition paradigms that are more closely matched for stimulus characteristics.
Similarly it is unclear whether the observed decrease in metacognitive efﬁciency is speciﬁc to visual perceptual metacogni-
tion, or may extend to other perceptual modalities or other aspects of decision-making. An additional difference between
domains is that the perceptual task used a staircase procedure to control task difﬁculty for each individual participant
whereas this was not feasible with the current word recognition task. By adjusting stimulus selection online such perfor-
mance control could be built into a memory paradigm in future studies. Finally, a small minority of older individuals strug-
gled to input conﬁdence ratings manually using the keyboard response, and their verbal ratings were instead entered by the
experimenter. We cannot rule out effects of changes in response modality on our results, but we note that even in older indi-
viduals metacognitive efﬁciency did not decline to ﬂoor levels (meta-d0/d0  0), indicating that conﬁdence ratings tracked
task performance in a meaningful way regardless of adjustments in response modality.
In summary, we reveal an age-related decline in perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency whilst controlling for age-related
differences in task performance and executive function. Our study is cross-sectional, and it is possible that other factors dif-
fering across the age range affected metacognitive ability. It will therefore be very informative in further work to investigate
longitudinal changes in metacognitive efﬁciency with age. Quantifying changes in metacognition with age is critical for our
understanding of higher-order cognitive functions in an aging population, especially as deﬁcits in metacognitive monitoring
may lead to impaired control of behaviour (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Aging-associated diseases such as Alzheimer’s are
accompanied by metacognitive deﬁcits that may lead to non-adherence to treatment and impaired decision-making
(Cosentino, 2014). Our results, when combined with previous research in adolescents (Weil et al., 2013), reveal a non-linear
relationship between age and perceptual metacognitive efﬁciency, increasing during adolescence, plateauing in early adult-
hood, and declining in older age.
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